Arbeitspapier
Dynamic bargaining and external stability with veto players
This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the nite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2015-12
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Anesi, Vincent
Duggan, John
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (where)
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Nottingham
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Anesi, Vincent
- Duggan, John
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Time of origin
- 2015
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Veto Player and the Greek Constitution, Part 3
Veto Player and the Greek Constitution, Part 4
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Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and rational behavior
Electoral reform in authoritarian regimes: veto player uncertainty in Jordan
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