- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Umfang
-
XII, 255 S.
- ISBN
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978-3-642-14199-7
- Identifier
-
1003136508
- Reihe
-
Springer finance
Thema
Kontrakttheorie ; Agency-Theorie ; Stochastische Kontrolltheorie ; Finanzmathematik
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf Teile des Objekts ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.04.2024, 08:51 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
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