Monografie
Agency theory : methodology, analysis : a structured approach to writing contracts
- Language
-
Englisch
- Extent
-
XVII, 213 S., S. XIX - XXVIII
- Notes
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Zugl.: Wien, Wirtschaftsuniv., Diss., 2003
- ISBN
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978-3-631-52973-7
- Identifier
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972707212
- Series
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Forschungsergebnisse der WU Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien; Bd. 3
Subject
Kontrakttheorie ; Agency-Theorie ; Hochschulschrift
Contributor
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf Teile des Objekts ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
16.08.2023, 6:23 PM CEST
Object type
- Monografie
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Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives : organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom
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Essays in dynamic contract theory
Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance
Essays in dynamic contract theory
Managerial incentives, corruption, and the internet : essays on moral hazard
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