- Language
-
Englisch
- Extent
-
XII, 255 S.
- ISBN
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978-3-642-14199-7
- Identifier
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1003136508
- Series
-
Springer finance
Subject
Kontrakttheorie ; Agency-Theorie ; Stochastische Kontrolltheorie ; Finanzmathematik
Contributor
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf Teile des Objekts ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.04.2024, 8:51 AM CEST
Object type
- Monografie
Other Objects (12)
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Managerial incentives, corruption, and the internet : essays on moral hazard
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Exponential functionals of Brownian motion and related processes
Studien zur mikroökonomischen Theorie der Gewerkschaft
Essays on contract design and incentive provision
On the value of information in trade relationships
Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives : organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
Contracting in the presence of career concerns
Essays in dynamic contract theory
Agency theory : methodology, analysis : a structured approach to writing contracts
Managerial incentives, corruption, and the internet : essays on moral hazard
Essays in dynamic contract theory
Three essays on information and incentives
Exponential functionals of Brownian motion and related processes
Studien zur mikroökonomischen Theorie der Gewerkschaft
Essays on contract design and incentive provision
On the value of information in trade relationships
Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives : organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
Contracting in the presence of career concerns
Essays in dynamic contract theory
Agency theory : methodology, analysis : a structured approach to writing contracts
Managerial incentives, corruption, and the internet : essays on moral hazard
Essays in dynamic contract theory
Three essays on information and incentives
Exponential functionals of Brownian motion and related processes