Managerial Incentives and Favoritism in Promotion Decisions: Theory and Field Evidence
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Deutsch
- Erschienen in
-
IZA Discussion Papers ; 5543
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Erwerbsverlauf
Personalauswahl
Führungskräfte
Patronage
Leistungsentgelt
Extensives Spiel
Theorie
Feldforschung
Berufserfolg
Karriere
Personalauswahl
Personalleiter
Vorgesetzter
Abteilungsleiter
Betriebsleiter
Führungskraft
Geschäftsführer
Leitender Angestellter
Topmanager
Direktor
Generaldirektor
Prokurist
Prokuristin
Geschäftsführerin
Fondsmanager
Betriebsleiterin
Chief Executive Officer
Nepotismus
Leistungslohn
Spieltheorie
Feldforschung
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wer)
-
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
- (wann)
-
2011
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104133606
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Berger, Johannes
- Herbertz, Claus
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
Entstanden
- 2011
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