Konferenzbeitrag
Partial Public Ownership and Managerial Incentives
We analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. A novelty of the paper is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We find that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all firms are partially owned by the government. When partially public firms compete with private firms, the effects on managerial incentives crucially depend on the degree of competitive pressure. Thereby, PPO induces either partially public firms or their private competitors to offer stronger managerial incentives. This result is essentially confirmed even if the government's primary concern is consumer protection rather than social welfare.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Antitrust Issues and Competition ; No. C21-V3
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Jovanovic, Dragan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Jovanovic, Dragan
Time of origin
- 2012
Other Objects (12)
Partial cross ownership and explicit collusion
Managerial Prudence under Banking Regulation
Public Private Partnerships: Strategic Assets and Managerial Models
Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation - a welfare analysis
Women's Managerial Representation and the Gender Pay Gap
Incentives for Collective Innovation
Managerial skills of women entrepreneurs in Dobrudgea's rural area
Managerial Versus Production Wages: Offshoring, Country Size and Endowments
The Efficiency Costs of Dividend Taxation with Managerial Firms
Impact of managerial risk-taking and IRM on innovation
A model of car ownership and use incorporating quality choice and ownership of multiple cars
Luxembourg a bastion of state ownership
Partial cross ownership and explicit collusion
Managerial Prudence under Banking Regulation
Public Private Partnerships: Strategic Assets and Managerial Models
Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation - a welfare analysis
Women's Managerial Representation and the Gender Pay Gap
Incentives for Collective Innovation
Managerial skills of women entrepreneurs in Dobrudgea's rural area
Managerial Versus Production Wages: Offshoring, Country Size and Endowments
The Efficiency Costs of Dividend Taxation with Managerial Firms
Impact of managerial risk-taking and IRM on innovation
A model of car ownership and use incorporating quality choice and ownership of multiple cars
Luxembourg a bastion of state ownership
Partial cross ownership and explicit collusion
Managerial Prudence under Banking Regulation
Public Private Partnerships: Strategic Assets and Managerial Models
Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation - a welfare analysis
Women's Managerial Representation and the Gender Pay Gap
Incentives for Collective Innovation
Managerial skills of women entrepreneurs in Dobrudgea's rural area
Managerial Versus Production Wages: Offshoring, Country Size and Endowments
The Efficiency Costs of Dividend Taxation with Managerial Firms
Impact of managerial risk-taking and IRM on innovation
A model of car ownership and use incorporating quality choice and ownership of multiple cars