Partial cross ownership and explicit collusion

Konferenzbeitrag

This article studies the unilateral and coordinated effects of non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS). It provides a comprehensive model by integrating the established models of Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Flath (1991), Malueg (1992), and Gilo et al. (2006). It is the first to add a competition authority. The model finds that NCMS lower the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of NCMS is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Corporate Governance ; No. A11-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Antitrust Law ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Paha, Johannes ; de Haas, Samuel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145640
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET