Konferenzbeitrag
The scope for collusion under different pricing schemes
We analyze and compare the incentives to collude under different pricing schemes in a differentiated-products market where customers have elastic demand. We show that allowing firms to set two-part tariffs as opposed to linear prices facilitates collusion at maximum prices independent of the degree of differentiation. However, compared to a situation where firms can only set fixed fees that are independent of the quantity purchased, collusion at maximum prices is less sustainable with two-part tariffs. The results have important implications for competition policy where the perspective—static or dynamic—may be crucial.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Collusion and Exclusionary Practices in Oligopoly ; No. E02-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rasch, Alexander
Gössl, Florian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel und Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
02.05.2031, 07:43 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Rasch, Alexander
- Gössl, Florian
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2016
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