Arbeitspapier
Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 32-2016
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Merger Control
Unilateral Effects
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
de Haas, Samuel
Paha, Johannes
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- de Haas, Samuel
- Paha, Johannes
- Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
Entstanden
- 2016
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