Arbeitspapier
Mergers and partial tacit collusion
This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences ; No. 15-2019
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Partial Collusion
Tacit Collusion
Mergers
Coordinated Effects
Non-coordinated Effects
Umbrella Effects
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Grüb, Jens
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Hohenheim, Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
- (wo)
-
Stuttgart
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-16981
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Grüb, Jens
- Universität Hohenheim, Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
Entstanden
- 2019
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