Does cooperation in manufactoring foster tacit collusion

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordination of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms intensify cooperation and produce in a joint plant, this profit is still higher due to lower investment costs. Since firms return to competition after a defection from the collusive agreement, a high competitive profit implies a weak punishment. Collusion is thus more difficult, the closer firms cooperate in manufacturing. Moreover, given competition or collusion in the market, joint production yields the highest profit and welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 261

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Organization of Production ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: ): Manufacturing ; Cooperative production ; Dynamic competition ; Collusion ; Produktion ; Unternehmenskooperation ; Oligopol ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Neubecker, Leslie
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): Tübingen
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47553
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18717
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ