Arbeitspapier
Supply chain innovations and partial ownership
We show that competing downstream firms may rather invest in their inefficient inhouse production than help improve the technology of the efficient supplier, even if this is costless. Even worse, a downstream firm can have strong incentives to decrease the efficiency of the supplier in order to improve its outside options. We demonstrate that non-controlling partial backward ownership can align the incentives of the supplier and its customers with respect to supply chain innovations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-280-6
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 281
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- Thema
-
knowledge spillover
innovation
minority shareholdings
supply chain efficiency
vertical partial ownership
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hunold, Matthias
Shekhar, Shiva
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hunold, Matthias
- Shekhar, Shiva
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2018
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