Partial collusion and foreign direct investment

Arbeitspapier

We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment is often a prisoners' dilemma game in which a switch from exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially collude by choosing to export rather than invest. In this range, a reduction in export costs may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2013/9

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations ; Multinational Firms; International Business
• Thema: Economics ; Foreign Direct Investment ; Partial Collusion ; Trade Liberalization

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Collie, David R. ; Norman, George
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (wo): Cardiff
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101121
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ