Arbeitspapier
Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low synergies—even when targets with high synergies are available—to obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 02/2014
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Thema
-
acquisition
merger
moral hazard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
Müller, Daniel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Müller, Daniel
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2014
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