Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the effects of synergies from horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly where principals provide their agents with incentives to cut marginal costs prior to choosing output. We stress that synergies come at a cost which possibly leads to a countervailing incentive effect: The merged firm's principal may be induced to stifle managerial incentives in order to reduce her agency costs. Whenever this incentive effect dominates the well-known direct synergy effect, synergies actually reduce consumer surplus which opposes the use of an efficiency defense in merger control.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN: 978-3-86304-087-1

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 88 [rev.]

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: Managerial Incentives ; Horizontal Mergers ; Merger Control ; Productive Efficiency Gains ; Synergies ; Efficiency Defense

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jovanovic, Dragan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97501
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ