Arbeitspapier
Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition
This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost-reducing R&D, and have higher output, lower prices and lower profits, as compared to profit-maximizers in an owner-run game. Secondly, we find that R&D collusion induces owners in a delegation game to choose more aggressive managerial incentives as compared to R&D competition, which in turn leads to increased R&D investment, reduced product prices and increased profits.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 295
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Production and Organizations: General
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Strategic Delegation
Managerial Incentives
R&D competition and R&D collusion
Industrielle Forschung
Wettbewerb
Duopol
Führungskräfte
Leistungsanreiz
Vertrag
Anreizvertrag
Spieltheorie
Forschungskooperation
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zhang, Zhentang
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zhang, Zhentang
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2002