Arbeitspapier

Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior

The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 638

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andergassen, Rainer
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2008

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4609
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Andergassen, Rainer
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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