Arbeitspapier
Ownership diversification and product market pricing incentives
We link investor ownership to profit loads on rival firms by the managers of a firm. We propose a theory model in which we distinguish between passive and active investors' holdings, where passive investors are relatively more diversified. We find that if passive investors become relatively bigger, then common ownership incentives increase. We show that these higher incentives, in turn, are linked to higher firm markups. We empirically confirm these relationships for public US firms in the years 2004-2012, where the financial crisis coincides with passive investors' rise. The found effects are small but non-negligible.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 2023
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Common ownership
investor diversification
product markets
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Banal-Estañol, Albert
Seldeslachts, Jo
Vives, Xavier
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2022
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Banal-Estañol, Albert
- Seldeslachts, Jo
- Vives, Xavier
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Time of origin
- 2022