Arbeitspapier

Ownership diversification and product market pricing incentives

We link investor ownership to profit loads on rival firms by the managers of a firm. We propose a theory model in which we distinguish between passive and active investors' holdings, where passive investors are relatively more diversified. We find that if passive investors become relatively bigger, then common ownership incentives increase. We show that these higher incentives, in turn, are linked to higher firm markups. We empirically confirm these relationships for public US firms in the years 2004-2012, where the financial crisis coincides with passive investors' rise. The found effects are small but non-negligible.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 2023

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Common ownership
investor diversification
product markets

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Banal-Estañol, Albert
Seldeslachts, Jo
Vives, Xavier
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Banal-Estañol, Albert
  • Seldeslachts, Jo
  • Vives, Xavier
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Time of origin

  • 2022

Other Objects (12)