Arbeitspapier

All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto- undominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different re- sponses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-020/II

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Thema
Spieltheorie
Analysis
Öffentliche Güter
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Klimawandel
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jaakkola, Niko
Wagener, Florian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jaakkola, Niko
  • Wagener, Florian
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)