Arbeitspapier

All Symmetric Equilibria in Differential Games with Public Goods

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto-undominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different responses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8246

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Thema
differential games
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
dynamic investment games
dynamic public goods
climate change

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jaakkola, Niko
Wagener, Florian O.O.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jaakkola, Niko
  • Wagener, Florian O.O.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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