Artikel

Equilibria in symmetric games: Theory and applications

This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for multiple symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, or how the equilibrium set depends on the nature of the strategies. The approach is particularly helpful in applications because (i) it allows the complexity of the uniqueness problem to be reduced to a two-player game, (ii) boundary conditions are less critical compared to standard procedures, and (iii) best replies need not be everywhere differentiable. The usefulness of the separation approach is illustrated with several examples, including an application to asymmetric games and to a two-dimensional price-information game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 979-1002 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Symmetric games
uniqueness
symmetric equilibrium
oligopoly

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hefti, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2151
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Hefti, Andreas
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2017

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