Arbeitspapier
Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 10-21
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
symmetric two-player games
zero-sum games
Rock-Paper-Scissors
single-peakedness
quasiconcavity
finite population evolutionary stable strategy
saddle point
exact potential games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Joerg
Schipper, Burkhard C.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Duersch, Peter
- Oechssler, Joerg
- Schipper, Burkhard C.
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010