Arbeitspapier

Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 10-21

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
symmetric two-player games
zero-sum games
Rock-Paper-Scissors
single-peakedness
quasiconcavity
finite population evolutionary stable strategy
saddle point
exact potential games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Joerg
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Department of Economics
(wo)
Davis, CA
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Duersch, Peter
  • Oechssler, Joerg
  • Schipper, Burkhard C.
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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