Arbeitspapier
Country Size and Public Good Provision
This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in smallcountries have greater influence over the nature of political decision mak-ing while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more publicgoods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessiveincentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of seces-sion rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreasescountry size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy arelarger than countries with a parliamentary democracy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-026/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
country size
public spending
structure of government
Landesgröße
Öffentliche Ausgaben
Öffentliche Güter
Staatsquote
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Staal, Klaas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Staal, Klaas
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2004
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
National Interference in Local Public Good Provision
Compensatory Public Good Provision by a Private Cartel
Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Birth Order, Family Size and Educational Attainment
Dedicated Doctors: Public and Private Provision of Health Care with Altruistic Physicians
Enhancing Efficiency of Water Provision
Pluralism in Economics: A Public Good or a Public Bad?
A Comment on Revealed Preference with a Subset of Goods
Variable Selection and Functional Form Uncertainty in Cross-Country Growth Regressions
The Impact of Firm-Provided Training on Production: Testing for Firm-Size Effects
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Traders: What is the Size of Reduced Search Costs and Who Benefits?
Working for a Good Cause
National Interference in Local Public Good Provision
Compensatory Public Good Provision by a Private Cartel
Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Birth Order, Family Size and Educational Attainment
Dedicated Doctors: Public and Private Provision of Health Care with Altruistic Physicians
Enhancing Efficiency of Water Provision
Pluralism in Economics: A Public Good or a Public Bad?
A Comment on Revealed Preference with a Subset of Goods
Variable Selection and Functional Form Uncertainty in Cross-Country Growth Regressions
The Impact of Firm-Provided Training on Production: Testing for Firm-Size Effects
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Traders: What is the Size of Reduced Search Costs and Who Benefits?
Working for a Good Cause
National Interference in Local Public Good Provision
Compensatory Public Good Provision by a Private Cartel
Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Birth Order, Family Size and Educational Attainment
Dedicated Doctors: Public and Private Provision of Health Care with Altruistic Physicians
Enhancing Efficiency of Water Provision
Pluralism in Economics: A Public Good or a Public Bad?
A Comment on Revealed Preference with a Subset of Goods
Variable Selection and Functional Form Uncertainty in Cross-Country Growth Regressions
The Impact of Firm-Provided Training on Production: Testing for Firm-Size Effects
Mobile Phones and Mozambique Traders: What is the Size of Reduced Search Costs and Who Benefits?