Arbeitspapier

Discretionary Policy, Multiple Equilibria, and Monetary Instruments

This paper examines monetary policy implementation in a sticky price model. The central bank's plan under discretionary optimization is entirely forward-looking and exhibits multiple equilibrium solutions if transactions frictions are not negligibly small. The central bank can then implement stable history dependent equilibrium sequences that are consistent with its plan by inertial interest rate adjustments or by money injections. These equilibria are associated with lower welfare losses than a forward-looking solution implemented by interest rate adjustments. The welfare gain from a history dependent implementation is found to rise with the strength of transactions frictions and the degree of price flexibility. It is further shown that the central bank's plan can uniquely be implemented in a history dependent way by money injections, whereas inertial interest rate adjustments cannot avoid equilibrium multiplicity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-098/2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Thema
Monetary policy implementation
optimal discretionary policy
history dependence
equilibrium indeterminacy
money growth policy
Geldpolitik
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Geldmengensteuerung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schabert, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schabert, Andreas
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2005

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