Arbeitspapier
Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payoffs. When players have different time preferences, reaching an immediate agreement may not be Pareto efficient. The recursive technique developed in this paper generalizes that of Shaked and Sutton (1984) by incorporating the possibility of making unacceptable proposals into the backward induction analysis. Results from this paper extend all the previous findings and resolve some open issues in the current literature.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-070/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Bargaining
negotiation
time preference
endogenous threats
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Dynamisches Spiel
Zeitpräferenz
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Houba, Harold
Wen, Quan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Houba, Harold
- Wen, Quan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2007
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