Arbeitspapier
From self-fulfilling mistakes to behavioral learning equilibria
This essay links some of my own work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality to the inspiring ideas of Jean-Michel Grandmont. In particular, my work on consistent expectations and behavioral learning equilibria may be seen as formalizations of JMG's ideas of self-fulfilling mistakes. Some of our learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments with human subjects have also been strongly influenced by JMG's ideas. Key features of self-fulfilling mistakes are multiple equilibria, excess volatility and persistence amplification.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 17-018/II
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Expectations; Speculations
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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expectations
learning
bounded rationality
chaos
almost self-fulfilling equilibria
laboratory experiments
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hommes, Cars
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hommes, Cars
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2017
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