Arbeitspapier

Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment

In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of dollars. At least 10 percent of the applicants made such mistakes in 2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a reform that substantially increased the selectivity of admission with financial aid in some fields of study. Increased admission selectivity raises the likelihood of making obvious mistakes, especially among high-socioeconomic status and low-achieving applicants. Our results suggest that mistakes are more common when their expected cost is lower. Still, the average cost of a mistake in 2013 was 114-365 dollars.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 17-107/V

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Market Design
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
College admissions
dominated strategies
market design
obvious misrepresentation
school choice
strategy-proof

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Shorrer, Ran I.
Sóvágó, Sándor
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Shorrer, Ran I.
  • Sóvágó, Sándor
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2017

Ähnliche Objekte (12)