Arbeitspapier
Mutation-selection equilibria for the ultimatum game
Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and proposers make proposals that on average more than meet the threshold. Their mutation however is global, and therefore biased. We show that when mutations are local, thresholds as well as proposals are considerably lower. In order to still arrive at averages in the simulations that match the averages we observe in the lab, we would have to resort to intensities of selection that are so low, that a match between the averages over time in the simulations and the averages found in experiments stops being an indication that the data are in line with what the model predicts.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-074/I
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Akdeniz, Aslihan
van Veelen, Matthijs
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2021
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Akdeniz, Aslihan
- van Veelen, Matthijs
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2021
Other Objects (12)
All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
Discretionary Policy, Multiple Equilibria, and Monetary Instruments
Behaviorally Rational Expectations and Almost Self-Fulfilling Equilibria
From self-fulfilling mistakes to behavioral learning equilibria
When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan
Behavioral Learning Equilibria
Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Time-Varying Mutation Rates in Coordination Games
Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labor Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogeneous Production Technologies
Reflexivity, Expectations Feedback and almost Self-fulfilling Equilibria: Economic Theory, Empirical Evidence and Laboratory Experiments
Quantity Constrained Equilibria
Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
Discretionary Policy, Multiple Equilibria, and Monetary Instruments
Behaviorally Rational Expectations and Almost Self-Fulfilling Equilibria
From self-fulfilling mistakes to behavioral learning equilibria
When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan
Behavioral Learning Equilibria
Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Time-Varying Mutation Rates in Coordination Games
Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labor Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogeneous Production Technologies
Reflexivity, Expectations Feedback and almost Self-fulfilling Equilibria: Economic Theory, Empirical Evidence and Laboratory Experiments
Quantity Constrained Equilibria
Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
Discretionary Policy, Multiple Equilibria, and Monetary Instruments
Behaviorally Rational Expectations and Almost Self-Fulfilling Equilibria
From self-fulfilling mistakes to behavioral learning equilibria
When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan
Behavioral Learning Equilibria
Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Time-Varying Mutation Rates in Coordination Games
Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labor Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogeneous Production Technologies
Reflexivity, Expectations Feedback and almost Self-fulfilling Equilibria: Economic Theory, Empirical Evidence and Laboratory Experiments
Quantity Constrained Equilibria