Arbeitspapier
Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key assumption that all continuation payoffs are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier. However, when players have different time preferences, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoffs above the bargaining frontier. We provide a thorough study of this problem without imposing the conventional assumption. Our results tie up all the previous findings, and also clarify the controversies that arose in the past.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-028/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Bargaining
Negotiation
Time Preference
Endogenous Threats
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Houba, Harold
Wen, Quan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Houba, Harold
- Wen, Quan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2006
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