Arbeitspapier
Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision
We introduce a two-stage, multiple-round voting procedure where the thresholds needed for approval require a qualified majority and vary with the proposal on the table. We apply such a procedure to instances of public-good provision where the citizens’ valuations can take two values and are private. We show that the procedure elicits and aggregates the information about the valuations and implements the utilitarian optimal public good level. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered. We also develop a compound procedure to ensure utilitarian optimality when there are arbitrarily finitely many types of citizen.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 17/272
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Subject
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voting
utilitarianism
implementation
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Tejada, Oriol
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (where)
-
Zurich
- (when)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000176287
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- Tejada, Oriol
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Time of origin
- 2017
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