Arbeitspapier

Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision

We introduce a two-stage, multiple-round voting procedure where the thresholds needed for approval require a qualified majority and vary with the proposal on the table. We apply such a procedure to instances of public-good provision where the citizens’ valuations can take two values and are private. We show that the procedure elicits and aggregates the information about the valuations and implements the utilitarian optimal public good level. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered. We also develop a compound procedure to ensure utilitarian optimality when there are arbitrarily finitely many types of citizen.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 17/272

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Subject
voting
utilitarianism
implementation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gersbach, Hans
Tejada, Oriol
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000176287
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Tejada, Oriol
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)