Arbeitspapier
Incredibility of perfect threats in repeated games: The dilemma of a rational player
The implicit assumption made when deterrence solutions to repeated games are constructed, is that perfectness is a sufficient condition for the credibility of threats. In this paper it is shown that the validity of this assumption hinges on another assumption which proves to be unsatisfactory - namely that players exhibit a different rationality at different stages of the game. A consequence of making rationality independent of time is that sufficient conditions for the credibility of threats fail to exist.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie A ; No. 202
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mohr, Ernst
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wann)
-
1985
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mohr, Ernst
- Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
Entstanden
- 1985
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