Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers subgame perfect equilibria of continuous-time repeated games with perfect monitoring when immediate reactions to deviations are allowed. The set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is shown to be a fixed-point of a set-valued operator introduced in the paper. For a large class of discrete time games the closure of this set corresponds to the limit payoffs of when the discount factors converge to one. It is shown that in the continuous-time setup pure strategies are sufficient for obtaining all equilibrium payoffs supported by the players' minimax values. Moreover, the equilibrium payoff set is convex and satisfies monotone comparative statics when the ratios of players' discount rates increase.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion paper ; No. 120

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: repeated game ; continuous time ; subgame perfection ; equilibrium payoff set

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kitti, Mitri
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
• (where): Turku
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233335
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET