Arbeitspapier

Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue that our model is the appropriate version for timing games. We show that the notion coincides with the usual one for discrete-time games. Many timing games in continuous time have only equilibria in mixed strategies - in particular preemption games, which often occur in the strategic real option literature. We provide a sound foundation for some workhorse equilibria of that literature, which has been lacking as we show. We obtain a general constructive existence result for subgame-perfect equilibria in preemption games and illustrate our findings by several explicit applications.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 524

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Firm Behavior: Theory
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
timing games
stochastic games
mixed strategies
subgame-perfect equilibrium in continuous time
optimal stopping

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Riedel, Frank
Steg, Jan-Henrik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(wo)
Bielefeld
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Riedel, Frank
  • Steg, Jan-Henrik
  • Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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