Arbeitspapier
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare four theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The four theories capture incomplete information (à la Kreps et al. (1982)) alongside the following four non-selfish motives: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious about cooperation (Duty), enjoying social-efficiency (Efficiency-Seeking), and reciprocity (Sequential Reciprocity). Our experimental design varies the decline-rate of future rewards, under which these theories make contrasting predictions. We find that Efficiency-Seeking is the other-regarding behavior that fits the experimental data best. A Finite Mixture Model analysis finds that 40-49% of our subjects are selfish, 36-45% are Efficiency-seeking, 1-4% are Duty players, and 6-20% are Altruistic.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 353
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
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Experimental Economics
Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Behavioral game theory
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Chakraborty, Anujit
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Davis, CA
- (wann)
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2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chakraborty, Anujit
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2022