Arbeitspapier

Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare four theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The four theories capture incomplete information (à la Kreps et al. (1982)) alongside the following four non-selfish motives: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious about cooperation (Duty), enjoying social-efficiency (Efficiency-Seeking), and reciprocity (Sequential Reciprocity). Our experimental design varies the decline-rate of future rewards, under which these theories make contrasting predictions. We find that Efficiency-Seeking is the other-regarding behavior that fits the experimental data best. A Finite Mixture Model analysis finds that 40-49% of our subjects are selfish, 36-45% are Efficiency-seeking, 1-4% are Duty players, and 6-20% are Altruistic.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 353

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Experimental Economics
Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Behavioral game theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chakraborty, Anujit
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Department of Economics
(wo)
Davis, CA
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chakraborty, Anujit
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2022

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