Decentralizing aid with interested parties

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses the decentralization of decisionmaking in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

Object Details

• ISBN: 9291907723
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Research Paper ; No. 2006/06

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economic Development: General ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; Foreign Aid ; Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models ; Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence ; Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth ; Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
• Subject: foreign aid ; governance ; decentralization ; rent seeking ; Entwicklungshilfe ; Dezentralisierung ; Rent Seeking ; Theorie ; Politische Entscheidung ; Good Governance

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63275
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET