Information sharing networks in oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We study the incentives of oligoplistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of fully connected components of increasing size. When linking is costly, non complete components may emerge, and components with larger size are less densily connected than components with smaller size. When signals have different variances, incomplete and irregular network can be stable, with firms observing high variance signals acting as critical nodes. Finally, when signals are correlated, the empty network may not be pairwise stable when the number of firms and/or correlation are large enough.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-13

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: information sharing ; oligopoly ; networks ; Bayesian equilibrium ; Wissenstransfer ; Unternehmensnetzwerk ; Asymmetrische Information ; Oligopol ; Bayes-Statistik ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Currarini, Sergio ; Feri, Francesco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (wo): Innsbruck
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71927
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ