Arbeitspapier
Bilateral oligopoly
In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl bargainings over contracts specifying price and quantity, between pairs of buyers and sellers. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration. The law of one price does not hold. Prices depend on concentration of capital and concentration of sales. If the quantity sold represents a small share of both the firms’ sales and purchases, the price is close to the Walrasian price.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 01-08
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Bilateral oligopoly
bargaining
intermediate goods
decentralized trade
Walrasian outcome
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Björnerstedt, Jonas
Stennek, Johan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Björnerstedt, Jonas
- Stennek, Johan
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2001