Arbeitspapier

Too much information sharing? Welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists' information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms' incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms' information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,40

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
oligopoly
information acquisition
information sharing
information structures
consumer surplus
Oligopol
Wissenstransfer
Informationsverhalten
Konsumentenrente
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ganuza, Juan José
Jansen, Jos
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ganuza, Juan José
  • Jansen, Jos
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2010

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