Information sharing in oligopoly: Sharing groups and core-periphery architectures

Artikel

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of collusion. Recent contributions have looked at bilateral information sharing, showing that information sharing is consistent with pairwise stability, This paper studies the networked pattern of bilateral information sharing on market demand, focusing on the role of heterogeneous information (firms' signals have different variances). We show that while pairwise stability predicts that i.i.d. signals are always shared in groups with a symmetric internal structure (both with and without side-payment and linking costs), heterogeneous signals are shared in asymmetric core-periphery architectures, in which "core" firms have more valuable information than periphery firms.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-17 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Bayesian equilibrium ; information sharing ; networks ; oligopoly

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Currarini, Sergio ; Feri, Francesco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g12040095
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257577
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ