Arbeitspapier
Economics of voluntary information sharing
We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets, consistent with lenders trading off new market entry against heightened competition. We exploit shocks to information coverage to show that lenders enter new markets after joining the bureau in a pattern consistent with this trade-off. Our results illuminate why intermediaries voluntarily share information and show how financial technology that mitigates information asymmetries can shape the boundaries of lending.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 869
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- Thema
-
information sharing
adverse selection
specialization
financial intermediation
collateral
credit bureaus
fintech
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Liberti, José
Sturgess, Jason
Sutherland, Andrew
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Liberti, José
- Sturgess, Jason
- Sutherland, Andrew
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2018