Arbeitspapier

Economics of voluntary information sharing

We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets, consistent with lenders trading off new market entry against heightened competition. We exploit shocks to information coverage to show that lenders enter new markets after joining the bureau in a pattern consistent with this trade-off. Our results illuminate why intermediaries voluntarily share information and show how financial technology that mitigates information asymmetries can shape the boundaries of lending.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 869

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
information sharing
adverse selection
specialization
financial intermediation
collateral
credit bureaus
fintech

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Liberti, José
Sturgess, Jason
Sutherland, Andrew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
(wo)
London
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Liberti, José
  • Sturgess, Jason
  • Sutherland, Andrew
  • Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Entstanden

  • 2018

Ähnliche Objekte (12)