Arbeitspapier

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert voluntarily whenever she receives a message. Our results are that under some conditions (i) the decision maker can obtain more detailed information from the expert than that in the Crawford and Sobel model and (ii) there exists an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford and Sobel model. Moreover, we find the upper bound of the receiver's equilibrium payoff, and provide a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver's payoff under a certain equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1006

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Incomplete information
Cheap talk
Multistage strategic communication
Voluntary monetary transfer

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sadakane, Hiroshi
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Sadakane, Hiroshi
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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