R&D collaboration networks in mixed oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2008,25

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General ; Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship ; Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
• Subject: Networks ; R&D Collaboration ; Mixed Oligopoly ; Betriebliche Forschung ; Unternehmenskooperation ; Forschungskooperation ; Oligopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zikos, Vasileios
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40651
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET