Multi-market competition, R&D, and welfare in oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process R&D investments wherein a multi-market monopolist meets entrants that enter one of the markets. We find that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent firm. That is, entry can stimulate R&D effort. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 796

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• Subject: multi-market ; oligopoly ; process R&D ; entry ; welfare ; Markteintritt ; Investition ; Technischer Fortschritt ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Oligopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kawasaki, Akio ; Lin, Ming Hsin ; Matsushima, Noriaki
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92835
• Last update: 10.03.0003, 11:44 AM CET