Arbeitspapier
Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly
In an oligopoly, prior to competing in the market, firms have an opportunity to form pair-wisecollaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links involve a commitment of resources andlead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms. The collection of pair-wise linksdefines a collaboration network. We study the architecture of strategically stable networks.Our analysis reveals that in a setting where firms are ex-ante identical, strategically stablenetworks are often asymmetric, with some firms having a large number of links while others havefew links or no links at all. We characterize such asymmetric networks; the dominant grouparchitecture, stars, and inter-linked stars are found to be stable. In asymmetric networks, thefirms with many links have lower costs of production as compared to firms with few links. Thuscollaboration links can have a major influence on the functioning of the market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-092/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Oligopol
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Forschungskooperation
Unternehmensnetzwerk
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goyal, Sanjeev
Joshi, Sumit
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goyal, Sanjeev
- Joshi, Sumit
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2000
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics
Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly
Competing Transport Networks
Collaboration in Bipartite Networks, with an Application to Coauthorship Networks
Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
The Formation of Financial Networks
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
A Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly Pricing
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration
Price Differentiation and Discrimination in Transport Networks
One-way Flow Networks: the Role of Heterogeneity
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics
Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly
Competing Transport Networks
Collaboration in Bipartite Networks, with an Application to Coauthorship Networks
Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
The Formation of Financial Networks
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
A Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly Pricing
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration
Price Differentiation and Discrimination in Transport Networks
One-way Flow Networks: the Role of Heterogeneity
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics
Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly
Competing Transport Networks
Collaboration in Bipartite Networks, with an Application to Coauthorship Networks
Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
The Formation of Financial Networks
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
A Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly Pricing
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration
Price Differentiation and Discrimination in Transport Networks