Arbeitspapier

Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly

In an oligopoly, prior to competing in the market, firms have an opportunity to form pair-wisecollaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links involve a commitment of resources andlead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms. The collection of pair-wise linksdefines a collaboration network. We study the architecture of strategically stable networks.Our analysis reveals that in a setting where firms are ex-ante identical, strategically stablenetworks are often asymmetric, with some firms having a large number of links while others havefew links or no links at all. We characterize such asymmetric networks; the dominant grouparchitecture, stars, and inter-linked stars are found to be stable. In asymmetric networks, thefirms with many links have lower costs of production as compared to firms with few links. Thuscollaboration links can have a major influence on the functioning of the market.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-092/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Oligopol
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Forschungskooperation
Unternehmensnetzwerk
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goyal, Sanjeev
Joshi, Sumit
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goyal, Sanjeev
  • Joshi, Sumit
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2000

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