Arbeitspapier

The mixed oligopoly of cross-border payment systems

This paper presents a model depicting cross-border payment systems as a mixed oligopoly.A private net settlement system that maximises profit competes with the central banks' gross settlement system that maximises welfare.It may be optimal for the central bank system to encourage increased use of the private system by charging fees that exceed the marginal cost.The central bank system is not only a competitor but also an essential service provider, because central bank money is needed for net settlement of payments in the private system.In some cases the central bank system can paradoxically induce the private system to charge lower fees by making it expensive to use central bank money for settlement purposes.

ISBN
952-462-212-2
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 11/2005

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Financial Institutions and Services: Other
Subject
payment systems
network economics
mixed oligopolies

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kauko, Karlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kauko, Karlo
  • Bank of Finland

Time of origin

  • 2005

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