Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly

Artikel

This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.

Object Details

• Alternative title: Privatización y política medioambiental en un oligopolio mixto
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Estudios de Economía ; ISSN: 0718-5286 ; Volume: 46 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 173-190

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
• Subject: Environmental tax ; emission standard ; mixed oligopoly ; privatization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dong, Quan ; Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos ; Garzón, Maria Begoña
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
• (where): Santiago de Chile
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/285070
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET