Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly

Artikel

This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Weitere Titel: Privatización y política medioambiental en un oligopolio mixto
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Estudios de Economía ; ISSN: 0718-5286 ; Volume: 46 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 173-190

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
• Thema: Environmental tax ; emission standard ; mixed oligopoly ; privatization

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dong, Quan ; Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos ; Garzón, Maria Begoña
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
• (wo): Santiago de Chile
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/285070
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ