Arbeitspapier

Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and receiving information. We consider multiple utility specifications. We show that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general, targeted information sharing is not necessarily better than collective information sharing. However, if all agents are either "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information sharing yields higher welfare than collective information sharing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 152

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Noncooperative Games
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Thema
Networks
network formation
unilateral connections
bilateral connections
targeted information sharing
collective information sharing
Google
Facebook
babblers
friends

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kushnir, Alexey
Nichifor, Alexandru
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-95041
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kushnir, Alexey
  • Nichifor, Alexandru
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2014

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