Arbeitspapier
Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks
We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and receiving information. We consider multiple utility specifications. We show that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general, targeted information sharing is not necessarily better than collective information sharing. However, if all agents are either "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information sharing yields higher welfare than collective information sharing.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 152
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Noncooperative Games
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- Thema
-
Networks
network formation
unilateral connections
bilateral connections
targeted information sharing
collective information sharing
Google
Facebook
babblers
friends
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kushnir, Alexey
Nichifor, Alexandru
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-95041
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kushnir, Alexey
- Nichifor, Alexandru
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014