Arbeitspapier

Employee Stock Ownership vs. Profit Sharing

The idea that profit sharing increases employment has been widely tested, but the theoretical basis for the claim is weak and the empirical results are ambiguous. This paper shows that employee stock ownership based on individually-held stakes avoids the problems of traditional profit sharing. Employee stock ownership shifts employment to the efficient level by either raising employment from an initial state of underemployment or decreasing it from an initial state of overemployment. Since the effect on employment is not unidirectional, empirical tests need to differentiate between traditional profit sharing and employee stock ownership and to condition on the initial state of employment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics ; No. 2000-28

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
Cooperative Enterprises
Thema
profit sharing
employee ownership
ESOPs
collective bargaining

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Harbaugh, Rick
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
(wo)
Claremont, CA
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Harbaugh, Rick
  • Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2000

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